








Passive smoking is the inhalation of smoke, called secondhand smoke (SHS) or environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), from tobacco products used by others. It occurs when tobacco smoke permeates any environment, causing its inhalation by people within that environment. Exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke causes disease, disability, and death. Currently, the health risks of secondhand smoke are a matter of scientific consensus, and these risks have been a major motivation for smoking bans in workplaces and indoor public places, including restaurants, bars and night clubs, as well as some open public spaces.
Passive smoking has played a central role in the debate over the harms and regulation of tobacco products. Since the early 1970s, the tobacco industry has viewed public concern over secondhand smoking as a serious threat to its business interests. Harm to bystanders was perceived as a motivator for stricter regulation of tobacco products. Despite the industry's awareness of the harms of secondhand smoke as early as the 1980s, the tobacco industry coordinated a scientific controversy with the aim of forestalling regulation of their products.
In 1992, the ''Journal of the American Medical Association'' published a review of available evidence on the relationship between secondhand smoke and heart disease, and estimated that passive smoking was responsible for 35,000 to 40,000 deaths per year in the United States in the early 1980s. The absolute risk increase of heart disease due to ETS was 2.2%, while the attributable risk percent was 23%.
Research using more exact measures of secondhand smoke exposure suggests that risks to nonsmokers may be even greater than this estimate. A British study reported that exposure to secondhand smoke increases the risk of heart disease among non-smokers by as much as 60%, similar to light smoking. Evidence also shows that inhaled sidestream smoke, the main component of secondhand smoke, is about four times more toxic than mainstream smoke. This fact has been known to the tobacco industry since the 1980s, though it kept its findings secret. Some scientists believe that the risk of passive smoking, in particular the risk of developing coronary heart diseases, may have been substantially underestimated.
A minority of epidemiologists find it hard to understand how environmental tobacco smoke, which is far more dilute than actively inhaled smoke, could have an effect that is such a large fraction of the added risk of coronary heart disease among active smokers. One proposed explanation is that secondhand smoke is not simply a diluted version of "mainstream" smoke, but has a different composition with more toxic substances per gram of total particulate matter. Passive smoking appears to be capable of precipitating the acute manifestations of cardio-vascular diseases (atherothrombosis) and may also have a negative impact on the outcome of patients who suffer acute coronary syndromes.
In 2004, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) of the World Health Organization (WHO) reviewed all significant published evidence related to tobacco smoking and cancer. It concluded:
Subsequent meta-analyses have confirmed these findings, and additional studies have found that high overall exposure to passive smoke even among people with non-smoking partners is associated with greater risks than partner smoking and is widespread in non-smokers.
The National Asthma Council of Australia cites studies showing that environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) is probably the most important indoor pollutant, especially around young children:
In France, passive smoking has been estimated to cause between 3,000 and 5,000 premature deaths per year, with the larger figure cited by Prime minister Dominique de Villepin during his announcement of a nationwide smoking ban: "That makes more than 13 deaths a day. It is an unacceptable reality in our country in terms of public health."
There is good observational evidence that smoke-free legislation reduces the number of hospital admissions for heart disease. In 2009 two studies in the United States confirmed the effectiveness of public smoking bans in preventing heart attacks. The first study, done at the University of California, San Francisco and funded by the National Cancer Institute, found a 15 percent decline in heart-attack hospitalizations in the first year after smoke-free legislation was passed, and 36 percent after three years. The second study, done at the University of Kansas School of Medicine, showed similar results. Overall, women, nonsmokers, and people under age 60 had the most heart attack risk reduction. Many of those benefiting were hospitality and entertainment industry workers.
A 2007 study in the Addictive Behaviors Journal found a positive correlation between secondhand tobacco smoke exposure and concentrations of nicotine and/or biomarkers of nicotine in the body. Significant biological levels of nicotine from secondhand smoke exposure were equivalent to nicotine levels from active smoking and levels that are associated with behavior changes due to nicotine consumption.
Environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) has been shown to produce more particulate-matter (PM) pollution than an idling low-emission diesel engine. In an experiment conducted by the Italian National Cancer Institute, three cigarettes were left smoldering, one after the other, in a 60 m³ garage with a limited air exchange. The cigarettes produced PM pollution exceeding outdoor limits, as well as PM concentrations up to 10-fold that of the idling engine.
Tobacco smoke exposure has immediate and substantial effects on blood and blood vessels in a way that increases the risk of a heart attack, particularly in people already at risk. Exposure to tobacco smoke for 30 minutes significantly reduces coronary flow velocity reserve in healthy nonsmokers.
Pulmonary emphysema can be induced in rats through acute exposure to sidestream tobacco smoke (30 cigarettes per day) over a period of 45 days. Degranulation of mast cells contributing to lung damage has also been observed.
The term "third-hand smoke" was recently coined to identify the residual tobacco smoke contamination that remains after the cigarette is extinguished and secondhand smoke has cleared from the air. Preliminary research suggests that byproducts of thirdhand smoke may pose a health risk, though the magnitude of risk, if any, remains unknown.
In 2008, there were more than 161,000 deaths attributed to lung cancer in the United States. Of these deaths, an estimated 10% to 15% were caused by factors other than first-hand smoking; equivalent to 16,000 to 24,000 deaths annually. Slightly more than half of the lung cancer deaths caused by factors other than first-hand smoking were found in nonsmokers. Lung cancer in nonsmokers may well be considered one of the most common cancer mortalities in the United States. Clinical epidemiology of lung cancer has linked the primary factors closely tied to lung cancer in nonsmokers as exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke, carcinogens including radon, and other indoor air pollutants.
The World Health Organization: The governments of 168 nations have signed and currently 170 have ratified the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which states that "Parties recognize that scientific evidence has unequivocally established that exposure to tobacco smoke causes death, disease and disability." The U.S. National Institutes of Health The Centers for Disease Control The United States Surgeon General The U.S. National Cancer Institute The United States Environmental Protection Agency The California Environmental Protection Agency The American Heart Association, American Lung Association, and American Cancer Society The American Medical Association The American Academy of Pediatrics The Australian National Health and Medical Research Council The United Kingdom Scientific Committee on Tobacco and Health
Recent major surveys conducted by the U.S. National Cancer Institute and Centers for Disease Control have found widespread public belief that secondhand smoke is harmful. In both 1992 and 2000 surveys, more than 80% of respondents agreed with the statement that secondhand smoke was harmful. A 2001 study found that 95% of adults agreed that secondhand smoke was harmful to children, and 96% considered tobacco-industry claims that secondhand smoke was not harmful to be untruthful.
A 2007 Gallup poll found that 56% of respondents felt that secondhand smoke was "very harmful", a number that has held relatively steady since 1997. Another 29% believe that secondhand smoke is "somewhat harmful"; 10% answered "not too harmful", while 5% said "not at all harmful".
Enstrom's ties to the tobacco industry also drew scrutiny; in a 1997 letter to Philip Morris, Enstrom requested a "substantial research commitment... in order for me to effectively compete against the large mountain of epidemiologic data and opinions that already exist regarding the health effects of ETS and active smoking." In a US racketeering lawsuit against tobacco companies, the Enstrom and Kabat paper was cited by the US District Court as "a prime example of how nine tobacco companies engaged in criminal racketeering and fraud to hide the dangers of tobacco smoke." The Court found that the study had been funded and managed by the Center for Indoor Air Research, a tobacco industry front group tasked with "offsetting" damaging studies on passive smoking, as well as by Phillip Morris who stated that Enstrom's work was "clearly litigation-oriented." Enstrom has defended the accuracy of his study against what he terms "illegitimate criticism by those who have attempted to suppress and discredit it."
Another component of criticism cited by Milloy focused on relative risk and epidemiological practices in studies of passive smoking. Milloy, who has a masters degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, argued that studies yielding relative risks of less than 2 were meaningless junk science. This approach to epidemiological analysis was criticized in the ''American Journal of Public Health'':
}}
The tobacco industry and affiliated scientists also put forward a set of "Good Epidemiology Practices" which would have the practical effect of obscuring the link between secondhand smoke and lung cancer; the privately-stated goal of these standards was to "impede adverse legislation". However, this effort was largely abandoned when it became clear that no independent epidemiological organization would agree to the standards proposed by Philip Morris et al.
In March 1998, before the study was published, reports appeared in the media alleging that the IARC and the World Health Organization (WHO) were suppressing information. The reports, appearing in the British ''Sunday Telegraph'' and ''The Economist'', among other sources, alleged that the WHO withheld from publication of its own report that supposedly failed to prove an association between passive smoking and a number of other diseases (lung cancer in particular).
In response, the WHO issued a press release stating that the results of the study had been "completely misrepresented" in the popular press and were in fact very much in line with similar studies demonstrating the harms of passive smoking. The study was published in the ''Journal of the National Cancer Institute'' in October of the same year. An accompanying editorial summarized:
}}
With the release of formerly classified tobacco industry documents through the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, it was found that the controversy over the WHO's alleged suppression of data had been engineered by Philip Morris, British American Tobacco, and other tobacco companies in an effort to discredit scientific findings which would harm their business interests. A WHO inquiry, conducted after the release of the tobacco-industry documents, found that this controversy was generated by the tobacco industry as part of its larger campaign to cut the WHO's budget, distort the results of scientific studies on passive smoking, and discredit the WHO as an institution. This campaign was carried out using a network of ostensibly independent front organizations and international and scientific experts with hidden financial ties to the industry.
Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and groups representing growers, distributors and marketers of tobacco took legal action, claiming that the EPA had manipulated this study and ignored accepted scientific and statistical practices.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina ruled in favor of the tobacco industry in 1998, finding that the EPA had failed to follow proper scientific and epidemiologic practices and had "cherry picked" evidence to support conclusions which they had committed to in advance. The court stated in part, “EPA publicly committed to a conclusion before research had begun…adjusted established procedure and scientific norms to validate the Agency's public conclusion... In conducting the ETS Risk Assessment, disregarded information and made findings on selective information; did not disseminate significant epidemiologic information; deviated from its Risk Assessment Guidelines; failed to disclose important findings and reasoning…"
In 2002, the EPA successfully appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The EPA's appeal was upheld on the preliminary grounds that their report had no regulatory weight, and the earlier finding was vacated.
In 1998, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, through the publication by its National Toxicology Program of the 9th Report on Carcinogens, listed environmental tobacco smoke among the known carcinogens, observing of the EPA assessment that "The individual studies were carefully summarized and evaluated."
}}
This strategy was outlined at an international meeting of tobacco companies in 1988, at which Philip Morris proposed to set up a team of scientists, organized by company lawyers, to "carry out work on ETS to keep the controversy alive." All scientific research was subject to oversight and "filtering" by tobacco-industry lawyers:
Philip Morris reported that it was putting "...vast amounts of funding into these projects... in attempting to coordinate and pay so many scientists on an international basis to keep the ETS controversy alive."
Accordingly, the tobacco industry have developed several strategies to minimize its impact on their business:
The industry has sought to position the passive smoking debate as essentially concerned with civil liberties and smokers' rights rather than with health, by funding groups such as FOREST. Funding bias in research; in all reviews of the effects of passive smoking on health published between 1980 and 1995, the only factor associated with concluding that passive smoking is not harmful was whether an author was affiliated with the tobacco industry. However, not all studies that failed to find evidence of harm were by industry-affiliated authors. Delaying and discrediting legitimate research (see for an example of how the industry attempted to discredit Hirayama's landmark study, and for an example of how it attempted to delay and discredit a major Australian report on passive smoking) Promoting "good epidemiology" and attacking so-called junk science (a term popularised by industry lobbyist Steven Milloy): attacking the methodology behind research showing health risks as flawed and attempting to promote sound science . Ong & Glantz (2001) cite an internal Phillip Morris memo giving evidence of this as company policy Creation of outlets for favorable research. In 1989, the tobacco industry established the International Society of the Built Environment, which published the peer-reviewed journal ''Indoor and Built Environment''. This journal did not require conflict-of-interest disclosures from its authors. With documents made available through the Master Settlement, it was found that the executive board of the society and the editorial board of the journal were dominated by paid tobacco-industry consultants. The journal published a large amount of material on passive smoking, much of which was "industry-positive".
Citing the tobacco industry's production of biased research and efforts to undermine scientific findings, the 2006 U.S. Surgeon General's report concluded that the industry had "attempted to sustain controversy even as the scientific community reached consensus... industry documents indicate that the tobacco industry has engaged in widespread activities... that have gone beyond the bounds of accepted scientific practice." The U.S. District Court, in ''U.S.A. v. Philip Morris et al.'', found that "...despite their internal acknowledgment of the hazards of secondhand smoke, Defendants have fraudulently denied that ETS causes disease."
On May 22, 2009, a three-judge panel of the Washington, D.C. U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously upheld the lower court's 2006 ruling.
As a consequence of the health risks associated with passive smoking, smoking bans in indoor public places, including restaurants, cafés, and nightclubs have been introduced in a number of jurisdictions, at national or local level, as well as some outdoor open areas. 1 Ireland was the first country in the world to institute an outright national ban on smoking in all indoor workplaces on 29 March 2004. Since then, many others have followed suit. The countries which have ratified the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) have a legal obligation to implement ''effective'' legislation "for protection from exposure to tobacco smoke in indoor workplaces, public transport, indoor public places and, as appropriate, other public places." (Article 8 of the FCTC) The parties to the FCTC have further adopted ''Guidelines on the Protection from Exposure to Secondhand Smoke'' which state that "effective measures to provide protection from exposure to tobacco smoke ... require the total elimination of smoking and tobacco smoke in a particular space or environment in order to create a 100% smoke free environment."
Opinion polls have shown considerable support for bans. In June 2007, a survey of 15 countries found 80% approval of smoking bans. A survey in France, reputedly a nation of smokers, showed 70% supporting a ban.
In April, 2010 the ''Canadian Medical Association Journal'' published a study evaluating the effects of a 10-year, three-stage smoking ban in Toronto. The study found that during the implementation of a restaurant smoking ban, hospital admissions for cardiovascular conditions declined by 39%, and admissions for respiratory conditions declined by 33%. No significant reductions in hospital admissions occurred in other cities which did not have smoking bans. The authors concluded that the study justified further efforts to reduce public exposure to tobacco smoke. In May 2006, Ontario instituted a comprehensive province-wide ban on smoking which extended the restrictions to all cities and municipalities in Ontario. However, not all researchers agree that this was a causal relationship, and a 2009 study of many smoking bans in the United States disagreed with these conclusions.
In 2001, a systematic review for the Guide to Community Preventative Services acknowledged strong evidence of the effectiveness of smoke-free policies and restrictions in reducing expose to environmental tobacco smoke. A follow up to this review, identified the evidence on which the effectiveness of smoking bans reduced the prevalence of tobacco use. Articles published until 2005, were examined to further support this evidence. The examined studies provided sufficient evidence that smoke-free policies reduce tobacco use among workers when implemented in worksites or by communities.
While a number of studies funded by the tobacco industry have claimed a negative economic impact of smoking bans, no independently funded research has shown any such impact. A 2003 review reported that independently funded, methodologically sound research consistently found either no economic impact or a positive impact from smoking bans.
Air nicotine levels were measured in Guatemalan bars and restaurants before and after an implemented smoking ban in 2009. Nicotine concentrations significantly decreased in both the bars and restaurants measured. Also, the employees support for a smoke-free workplace substantially increased in the post-ban survey compared to pre-ban survey. The result of this smoking ban provides a considerable more healthy work environment for the staff.
The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) officially concluded in 2005 that while completely isolated smoking rooms do eliminate the risk to nearby non-smoking areas, smoking bans are the only means of completely eliminating health risks associated with indoor exposure. They further concluded that no system of dilution or cleaning was effective at eliminating risk. The U.S. Surgeon General and the European Commission Joint Research Centre have reached similar conclusions. The implementation guidelines for the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control states that engineering approaches, such as ventilation, are ineffective and do not protect against secondhand smoke exposure. However, this does ''not'' necessarily mean that such measures are useless in reducing harm, only that they fall short of the goal of reducing exposure completely to zero.
Others have suggested a system of tradable smoking pollution permits, similar to the cap-and-trade pollution permits systems used by the Environmental Protection Agency in recent decades to curb other types of pollution. This would guarantee that a portion of bars/restaurants in a jurisdiction will be smoke free, while leaving the decision to the market.
Multiple studies have been conducted to determine the carcinogenicity of environmental tobacco smoke to animals. These studies typically fall under the categories of simulated environmental tobacco smoke, administering condensates of sidestream smoke, or observational studies of cancer among pets.
To simulate environmental tobacco smoke, scientists expose animals to sidestream smoke, that which emanates from the cigarette's burning cone and through its paper, or a combination of mainstream and sidestream smoke. The IARC monographs conclude that mice with prolonged exposure to simulated environmental tobacco smoke, that is 6hrs a day, 5 days a week, for five months with a subsequent 4 month interval before dissection, will have significantly higher incidence and multiplicity of lung tumors than with control groups.
The IARC monographs concluded that sidestream smoke condensates had a significantly higher carcinogenic effect on mice than did mainstream smoke condensates.
;Tobacco industry : Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents from the World Health Organization
;Other links
Category:Articles with inconsistent citation formats Category:Cigarettes Category:Tobacco Category:Smoking
ar:تدخين سلبي ca:Fumador passiu cs:Pasivní kouření da:Passiv rygning de:Passivrauchen es:Fumador pasivo eo:Pasiva fumado fr:Tabagisme passif ko:간접 흡연 hr:Pasivno pušenje id:Perokok pasif it:Fumo passivo sw:Kuvuta moshi wa sigara inayotumiwa na mtu mwingine lb:Passivfëmmen hu:Passzív dohányzás nl:Passief roken ja:受動喫煙 no:Passiv røyking pl:Bierne palenie tytoniu pt:Tabagismo passivo ru:Пассивное курение sk:Pasívne fajčenie sh:Pasivno pušenje fi:Passiivinen tupakointi sv:Passiv rökning vi:Hút thuốc thụ động zh:二手煙This text is licensed under the Creative Commons CC-BY-SA License. This text was originally published on Wikipedia and was developed by the Wikipedia community.
The World News (WN) Network, has created this privacy statement in order to demonstrate our firm commitment to user privacy. The following discloses our information gathering and dissemination practices for wn.com, as well as e-mail newsletters.
We do not collect personally identifiable information about you, except when you provide it to us. For example, if you submit an inquiry to us or sign up for our newsletter, you may be asked to provide certain information such as your contact details (name, e-mail address, mailing address, etc.).
When you submit your personally identifiable information through wn.com, you are giving your consent to the collection, use and disclosure of your personal information as set forth in this Privacy Policy. If you would prefer that we not collect any personally identifiable information from you, please do not provide us with any such information. We will not sell or rent your personally identifiable information to third parties without your consent, except as otherwise disclosed in this Privacy Policy.
Except as otherwise disclosed in this Privacy Policy, we will use the information you provide us only for the purpose of responding to your inquiry or in connection with the service for which you provided such information. We may forward your contact information and inquiry to our affiliates and other divisions of our company that we feel can best address your inquiry or provide you with the requested service. We may also use the information you provide in aggregate form for internal business purposes, such as generating statistics and developing marketing plans. We may share or transfer such non-personally identifiable information with or to our affiliates, licensees, agents and partners.
We may retain other companies and individuals to perform functions on our behalf. Such third parties may be provided with access to personally identifiable information needed to perform their functions, but may not use such information for any other purpose.
In addition, we may disclose any information, including personally identifiable information, we deem necessary, in our sole discretion, to comply with any applicable law, regulation, legal proceeding or governmental request.
We do not want you to receive unwanted e-mail from us. We try to make it easy to opt-out of any service you have asked to receive. If you sign-up to our e-mail newsletters we do not sell, exchange or give your e-mail address to a third party.
E-mail addresses are collected via the wn.com web site. Users have to physically opt-in to receive the wn.com newsletter and a verification e-mail is sent. wn.com is clearly and conspicuously named at the point of
collection.If you no longer wish to receive our newsletter and promotional communications, you may opt-out of receiving them by following the instructions included in each newsletter or communication or by e-mailing us at michaelw(at)wn.com
The security of your personal information is important to us. We follow generally accepted industry standards to protect the personal information submitted to us, both during registration and once we receive it. No method of transmission over the Internet, or method of electronic storage, is 100 percent secure, however. Therefore, though we strive to use commercially acceptable means to protect your personal information, we cannot guarantee its absolute security.
If we decide to change our e-mail practices, we will post those changes to this privacy statement, the homepage, and other places we think appropriate so that you are aware of what information we collect, how we use it, and under what circumstances, if any, we disclose it.
If we make material changes to our e-mail practices, we will notify you here, by e-mail, and by means of a notice on our home page.
The advertising banners and other forms of advertising appearing on this Web site are sometimes delivered to you, on our behalf, by a third party. In the course of serving advertisements to this site, the third party may place or recognize a unique cookie on your browser. For more information on cookies, you can visit www.cookiecentral.com.
As we continue to develop our business, we might sell certain aspects of our entities or assets. In such transactions, user information, including personally identifiable information, generally is one of the transferred business assets, and by submitting your personal information on Wn.com you agree that your data may be transferred to such parties in these circumstances.